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THE HISTORICAL RATIONALE OF THE SPEECH-ANDPRESS CLAUSE OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT
BENJAmin

A.

RIC-ARDS*

The first amendment to the Constitution of the United States provides
that "Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech, or
of the press... ." No reasons for this prohibition are given in the Constitution, unless they be in the Preamble, which proclaims several purposes that
could be served by the prohibition and were probably thought to be so
served by those who proposed and those who ratified the Bill of Rights.'
The freedoms of speech and press are not mentioned in the Declaration of
Independence, but the political philosophy tersely set forth in its second
paragraph certainly furnishes a rationale for prohibiting the abridgment of
those freedoms. 2 Government is said to be instituted among men in order
to secure their unalienable rights to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness
and to effect their safety and happiness. According to one interpretation,
the freedoms of speech and of the press may be viewed as particular forms
of what Jefferson called men's "rightful liberty" to act unrestrained according
to their will within the limits drawn by the equal rights of others. 3 The
justification of governmental protection in this case is that men have a
God-given right to liberty in the sense indicated and therefore a right to the
freedoms of speech and of the press as part of it. According to a second
interpretation, these freedoms do not fall within the meaning of "liberty"
even in the broad Jeffersonian sense, but they may nevertheless be regarded
as so essential that their protection is necessary to secure that "liberty" from
governmental encroachment. 4 The justification in this case is that governments are instituted to secure the right to liberty and that in order to achieve
this end they must safeguard the freedoms of speech and of the press. Whichever interpretation is correct, the passage offers a concise justification for
safeguarding those freedoms.
Much more explicit reasons are to be found in some of the early state
constitutions.5 These declare that "the people have a right to freedom of
OB.A. 1942, Wesleyan University; M.A. 1948, Ph.D. 1959, Yale University; Member of
Department of Philosophy, Ithaca College, Ithaca, New York.
1. The purposes are those of establishing justice, of promoting the general welfare, and
of securing the blessings of liberty. For James Madison's defense of the amendments he
presented on June 8, 1789, in the first session of the House of Representatives, see 1 ANNALS
OF CONG. 432 (1789).

2. Judge Dumbauld maintains that it was through the adoption of the Bill of Rights
that the spirit of the Declaration of Independence was infused into the Constitution. E.
DUMBAULD, THE BiLr OF RimHs AND WHAT FT MEANS TODAY 141 (1957).
3. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Isaac H. Tiffany, April 4, 1819.
4. The protection of the freedoms of speech and press can be considered necessary to
preserve the rightful liberty of citizens from the tyranny of unjust laws and oppressive
magistrates.
5. The constitutions of eight states contained bills of rights: Delaware, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, Vermont, and Virginia. The bills
[203]
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speech, and of writing and publishing their sentiments." 6 They imply that
this right is among those that government is instituted to protect. They claim
that "the liberty of the press is essential to the security of freedom."7 And
they conclude that this freedom "ought not to be restrained."8 In several
constitutions this conclusion is drawn from the statement immediately preceding it or from a metaphorical variant to the effect that "the freedom of
the press is one of the great bulwarks of liberty." 9 In others it is drawn from
the statement that "the people have a right to freedom of speech, and of
writing and publishing their sentiments." Thus, some look back for a justifying reason to the people's right to speak and write and publish their sentiments, while others look forward to the consequence of not permitting
infringement of liberty of the press- namely, that of securing freedom. 0
That the freedom to be secured is freedom from governmental oppression
can readily be gathered from the general purport of the declaration of rights
and from the stated objects of specified articles. Virtually all of the declarations proclaim the right of the community to reform, alter, or totally change
any government when their protection, safety, prosperity, and happiness
require it." Several of them assert that this may be done "whenever public
liberty [is] manifestly endangered.... " 12 Most of them declare that elections
ought to be free, or free and frequent, or free, certain, and regular, or all
four of these. The two declarations affirming that "all elections ought to be
free and frequent" give this reason: "the right in the people to participate
13
in the Legislature, is the foundation of liberty and of all free government."'
Four of the declarations contain an article that states in substance that the
people have a right to return their public officers to private life and to fill
the vacancies by certain and regular elections in order that those employed
in the legislative and executive business of the state may be restrained from

of rights of these eight states and the constitutions of Georgia and South Carolina all contained free press provisions. But only the constitutions of Pennsylvania and Vermont contained both free speech and free press. The Maryland constitution guaranteed its legislators
freedom of speech and debate.
6. E.g., PA. CoNsr. Decl. of Rights, art. XII (1776); VT. CONST. ch. I, art. XIV (1777).
7. E.g., Part the First MASS. CONsT. art. XVI (1780); N.H. CONgs. art. XXII, pt. I (1784).
8. The words quoted are taken from the articles cited supra note 6. Similar provisions
appear in DEL. CONsT. Ded. of Rights §23 (1776); GA. CoNsr. art. LXI (1777); MD. CONsr.
Decl. of Rights, art. XXXVIII; N.C. CONsT. Decl. of Rights, art. XV (1776); S.C. CONsr.
art XLIII (1778) and in constitutional articles cited supra note 7.
9. The "bulwarks" metaphor is used in the VA. CONsr. Bill of Rights §12 (1776) and
N.C. CONsr. Decl. of Rights, art. XV. It is also used in Cato's Letters No. 15 (Feb. 4, 1720).
See THE ENGLISH LIBERTARIAN HERITAGE 38, 42 (D. Jacobson ed. 1965).
10. Professor Rossiter has pointed out that pamphleteers of the American Revolution
considered the freedoms of speech, press, assembly, and petition "not only individual rights
but social necessities, conditions essential to the conduct of representative government."
C. RossnIEt, THE POLITICAL THOUGHT OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 121, 219, 220 (1963).
11. See DEL. CONsT. DecI. of Rights §4; MD. CONST. Decl. of Rights art. IV; MASS. CONST.
Del. of Rights art. VII; N.H. CONST. Bill of Rights, art. X; VA. CONST. Bill of Rights §3.
12. DEL. CONsT. Decl. of Rights §5; MD. CoNsr. Decl. of Rights art. IV; N.H. CoNsT.
Bill of Rights art. X.
13. DEL. CONsT. Del. of Rights §6; MD. CONST. Decl. of Rights art. V.
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oppression.' 4 It requires no special insight or familiarity with American
political thought of that period to recognize the presupposition that the rights
to reform a bad government and to remove oppressive officers can be intelligently and effectively exercised only if the people have unrestricted access to
information about official conduct.' 5 In many of the early state constitutions,
then, the reasons for declaring the right to freedom of expression and for
seeking to preserve it are substantially set forth.
Whether the same reasons impelled those who recommended, those who
formally proposed, and those who finally ratified what was to become the first
amendment to the Federal Constitution, it is the purpose of this inquiry to
determine. An effort will be made to assemble and canvass the reasons
advanced for prohibiting Congress from abridging thd freedoms of speech
and press by delegates to the state conventions ratifying the Constitution,
by members of the first Congress who proposed the amendments, by members
of the state legislatures who ratified ten of the twelve proposed amendments,
and by other public men of the generation of the framers. Taken together,
these reasons can be viewed as the official justification of the first amendment's
guarantee of freedom of expression.
None of the plans laid before the Philadelphia Convention included a
bill of rights, nor did the resolutions that were submitted to the Committee
of Detail on July 26, 1787. The first attempt to secure anything resembling a
bill of rights was made on August 20, 1787, when Charles Pinckney offered
thirteen propositions, one of which read: "The liberty of the Press shall be inviolably preserved."' 6 These propositions were referred without debate to the
14. MASS. CONs'r. Deci. of Rights art. VIII; PA. CONsr. DecI. of Rights art. VI; VT. CONST.

DecI. of Rights art. VII; VA. CONsr. Bill of Rights §.
15. The Massachusetts Constitution of 1780 was drawn up by John Adams, who much
earlier had written that "liberty cannot be preserved without a general knowledge among
the people... He declared that the people "have a right, from the frame of their nature,
to knowledge, as their great Creator, who does nothing in vain, has given them understandings and a desire to know; but besides this, they have a right, an indisputable, unalienable, indefeasible, divine right to that most dreaded and envied kind of knowledge -I
mean, of the characters and conduct of their rulers. Rulers are no more than attorneys,
agents, and trustees for the people; and if the cause, the interest and trust, is insidiously
betrayed or wantonly trifled away, the people have a right to revoke the authority that
they themselves have deputed and to constitute abler and better agents, attorneys, and
trustees." J. ADAMS, A Dissertation on the Canon and Feudal Law, in THE POLITICAL
Whrrims oF JOHN ADAMs 13 (G. Peek, Jr. ed. 1954). Compare the quoted passage with
MAss. CONsr. DecI. of Rights, arts. V, VIII, XVI. In the Dissertation Adams went on to
say that none of the means of information is more sacred than the press; and his views
call to mind those propounded in the "Address to the Inhabitants of Quebec," sent by the
First Continental Congress, of which Adams was a member. Among the "five great rights"
mentioned in the Address was the freedom of the press. Its importance was said to consist,
"besides the advancement of truth, science, morality and arts in general, in its diffusion of
liberal sentiments on the administration of Government, its ready communication of thoughts
between subjects, and its consequential promotion of union among them, whereby oppressive
officers are shamed or intimidated, into more honourable and just modes of conducting
affairs." Letter Addressed to the Inhabitants of the Province of Quebec, Oct. 26, 1774,
JOURNAL OF TIM CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 1, 108 (W. Ford ed. 1904).
16. 2 THE REcORDs OF TmH FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 334, 341 (3d ed. M.
Farrand ed. 1937) [hereinafter cited as Farrand's REcoRDs].
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Committee of Detail, but that committee made no report on them. On September 12 a motion was made by Elbridge Gerry for a committee to prepare a bill
of rights,"7 and on September 14 Pinckney and Gerry moved to insert a
declaration "that the liberty of the Press should be inviolably observed."',
Both motions were defeated, 19 and debate was apparently scanty in each
case. 20 Colonel George Mason seconded the former motion and expressed the
wish that the Constitution be prefaced with a bill of rights because this would,
2
Roger Sherman opposed the
he thought "give great quiet to the people.."
motion on the ground that "The State Declarations of Rights are not repealed
22
The records do not
by this Constitution; and being in force are sufficient."
reveal what, if anything, was said in support of the latter motion. Sherman
again spoke in opposition. He pronounced the proposed declaration unneces' ' 23
The
sary because the "power of Congress does not extend to the Press.
defeat of these motions suggests that most of the delegates found Sherman's
arguments convincingY4
In the ensuing debate over ratification, the writers of The Federalist were
called upon to justify the absence of a bill of rights from the proposed
Constitution. In No. 84 of The Federalist Alexander Hamilton declared a
bill of rights unnecessary and even dangerous, because it would contain
various exceptions to powers not granted to the general government and
would thereby afford a colorable pretext to claim more than were actually
granted.2 5 "For why declare that things shall not be done which there is no
17. Id. at 582, 588.
18. Id. at 617.
19. Id. at 583, 588, 611, 618. Professor Holcombe states that all efforts to secure the
inclusion of a bill of rights failed "either because delegates had little faith in the practical
efficacy of declarations of general principles or because they believed that the fundamental
rights of Americans were sufficiently protected by the declarations in the state constitutions
and by the incorporation in the Federal Constitution of provisions protecting the most
important rights against abridgment by the Congress." A. HOLCOMIBE, OUR MoRE PERFEcT
UNION 45 (1950).

20. I say "apparently" because neither the journal of the convention nor the notes
of various of its members show that any more was said in debate on these motions than
what is indicated above. It may well be, however, that the whole matter of the liberty of
the press was debated at considerable length, as Charles Pinckney implied in a speech made
before the House of Representatives of South Carolina on January 18, 1788. See THE
DEBATES OF THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION
IV, 315-16 (2d ed. J. Elliott ed. 1836) [hereinafter cited as Elliot's DEBATES].
21. 2 Farrand's REcoRDs, supra note 16, at 587-88.

22. Id. at 588.
23. Id. at 618.
24. The defeat of these motions is not the sole evidence that the delegates either were
convinced by or agreed with Sherman's contentions. Some of them later made use of similar
arguments during the ratification debate, e.g., Alexander Hamilton in THE FEDERALIST No. 14,
James Wilson in a speech before the Pennsylvania Convention, Edmund Randolph before
the Virginia Convention and Charles Pinckney before the South Carolina House of Representatives. See 2 Elliot's DEBATES 436, 468; 3 Elliot's DEBATES 204, 469; 4 Elliot's DEBATES 315.
25. James Wilson told a meeting of the citizens of Philadelphia that the omission of a
bill of rights was no defect "for it would have been superfluous and absurd, to have
stipulated with a Federal body of our own creation, that we should enjoy those privileges,
of which we are not divested either by the intention or the act that has brought that
body into existence." PAMPHLETS ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 155 (P. Ford
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power to do? Why, for instance, should it be said that the liberty of the
press shall not be restrained, when no power is given by which restrictions
may be imposed?" 26 Similar arguments were presented by James Wilson to
the Pennsylvania convention, by Theophilus Parsons to the Massachusetts
convention, by Governor Randolph to the Virginia convention, by James
Iredell to the North Carolina convention, and by Charles Pinckney to the
South Carolina House of Representatives.2 7 Having taken the position that
the freedom of the press and other rights were in no need of special protection,
the Federalists had no cause to consider what values would be realized or
what evils would be averted by providing such protection.
Many of those who opposed ratification thought the omission of a bill
of rights meant that there was "no security in the profered system, either
for the rights of conscience or the liberty of the Press . . ."28 It was feared
that Congress might trample on these rights under guise of exercising "an
indefinite power to provide for the general welfare" 29 and a power to make
"all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution"
its enumerated powers. 0 George Mason asked the delegates to the Virginia
convention why, if oppressions arose under the new government and such
abuses were exposed by any writer, Congress could not say that such disclosures were "destroying the general peace, encouraging sedition, and poisoning
the minds of the people?"31 Patrick Henry insisted that the presence of
various restrictions on Congress plainly demonstrated that Congress could
exercise powers by implication and, consequently, that negative clauses were
needed to prevent the exercise of powers not expressly given.3 2 Henry
demanded a bill of rights to protect the great objects of religion and the
liberty of the press. But neither he nor any other delegate to the Virginia
convention undertook to specify those "great objects" in any detail. In fact,
their speeches give no more indication of the nature of the evils they sought
to avert than do the statements quoted or paraphrased above. These opponents of ratification found it sufficient to their purposes to issue dark warnings
of how the people's liberties might suffer at the hands of an arbitrary
33
Congress.
ed. 1888). He pointed out that inasmuch as no power had been granted to regulate literary
publications "it would have been merely nugatory to have introduced a formal declaration"
prohibiting its exercise. Id. at 157.
26. TnE Frnmnisr No. 84, at 559 (Mod. Lib. ed. 1937) (Hamilton).
27. See 2 Elliot's DEBATEs 161-62, for Parson's argument; 4 Elliot's DEBATEs 164 for
Iredell's; and references cited note 24 supra for the others.

28. The words quoted are from a pamphlet entitled Observations on the New Constitution, and on the Federal and State Conventions by Mercy Otis Warren and long attributed to Elbridge Gerry. PAMPHL=I

29. 3 Elliot's

DEBATES

supra note 25, at 6.

449.

30. Id. at 441. Such fears were expressed by delegates to various of the state conventions, e.g., by William Grayson and George Mason in the Virginia Convention. See generally
3 Elliot's DEBATEs 441-49.

31.
52.
33.
160-61

Id. at 442.
Id. at 445.
See J. MAIN,
(1961).

THE AmnT

,ERALiSrS,CRMCS OF THE CONSTrrTmoN,

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1968

1781-1788, at

5

Florida Law Review, Vol. 21, Iss. 2 [1968], Art. 2
UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XXI

Seven of the state conventions recommended in their ratifications that
certain amendments be made to the Constitution. 34 Two of these seven
declared and made known various rights that could not, as they put it, "be
abridged or violated"; 35 and two others recommended the addition of a
declaration of rights. 36 All four included freedom of the press among the
rights they listed. Three of the four offered an article that asserted both
that "the people have a right to freedom of speech, and of writing and publishing their sentiments" and that "the freedom of the press is one of the
greatest bulwarks of liberty and ought not to be violated." These passages
announce the very same beliefs that were expressed by various articles of the
state declarations of rights. In fact, the first one seems to have been taken
verbatim from section 12 of the Pennsylvania Declaration of Rights, and the
latter employs the same "bulwarks" metaphor that was first used in section 12
of the Virginia Bill of Rights.
Among the amendments that James Madison presented during the first
session of the first Congress was one that read: "The people shall not be
deprived or abridged of their right to speak, to write, or to publish their
sentiments; and the freedom of the press, as one of the great bulwarks of
liberty, shall be inviolable."37 Madison met the argument that a bill of rights
was unnecessary by pointing out that even if the general government kept
within the limits of its prescribed authority "it has certain discretionary
powers with respect to the means, which may admit of abuse to a certain
extent, because.., there is a clause granting to Congress the power to make
all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution all
the powers vested in the Government of the United States .

. ."38

In urging

the House of Representatives to propose amendments designed to secure "the
great rights of mankind," he told the members: 39
If they are incorporated into the constitution, independent tribunals
of justice will consider themselves in a peculiar manner the guardians
of those rights; they will be an impenetrable bulwark against every
assumption of power in the legislative or executive; they will be
naturally led to resist ever encroachment upon rights expressly stipulated for in the constitution by the declaration of rights.
After a brief debate Madison's propositions were referred to a select
committee that was appointed to consider and present proposed amendments.
Among the propositions that it reported to the House was one reading:
34. Massachusetts, I Elliott's DEBATES 319; New Hampshire, id. at 325-27; New York, id.
at 327-31; North Carolina, id. at 331-32, Rhode Island, id. at 334-37; South Carolina, id. at
325; Virginia, id. at 327.
35. New York, id. at 329 and Rhode Island, id. at 335.
36. Virginia, 3 Elliot's DEBATES 657 and North Carolina, I Elliot's DEBATES 331.
37. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 451 (1789). Representative James Jackson of Georgia contended
that the amendments were "unnecessary if not dangerous." Securing the liberty of the
press was unnecessary, he said, because Congress was given no power to regulate this subject. Id. at 442.
38. Id. at 438.
39. Id. at 439.
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"The freedom of speech and of the press, and the right of the people peaceably to assemble and consult for their common good, and to apply to the
Government for redress of grievances, shall not be infringed." This article
was accepted in this form by the House and was debated at length, but attention focused almost entirely on the second clause.40 No Representative found
it necessary to advance reasons for protecting the freedoms of speech and press
from infringement. The Senate modified the House article and added two
dauses dealing with religion, the first of which was reworded in conference. 4'
Since the Senate Journal contains a record only of motions made and the
affirmative or negative action taken on them, we do not know what, if anything, was said on the subject of speech and press. The same is true of the
journals of the state legislatures for the sessions in which ten of the twelve
amendments submitted to the states were ratified.
Professor Levy has observed that in the controversy over the Sedition
Act public men of the generation of the framers for the first time expressed
themselves with force, clarity, and detail on the meaning and the limitations
of the freedoms of speech and press. 42 Most of the discussion concerned the
import and intent of the speech-and-press clause and the nature and scope
of the protection it provides. 43 But some attention was given to the rationale
of the constitutional guarantee. For example, Representative John Nicholas
of Virginia, in the course of questioning the constitutionality of the Sedition
Bill, told members of the House that no definition of freedom of press would,
as he put it, satisfy the inquiry, because it had been the object of all regulation of the press to destroy the only means by which the people can examine
and become acquainted with the conduct of public persons. 44 In partial
40. A convenient account is to be found in B. MrrcHnru & L. MrrcnELL, A BIOGRAPHY
OF THE CONsrrrTTmON OF THE UNITED STATES 195-97 (1964). See also R. RUTLAND, THE
BIRTH OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS 206-08 (1955).
41. See E. DuawuL, THE Br.L OF RIGHTS AND WHAT IT MEANS TODAY 45, 49 (1957).
42. L LEVY, FR:EEDOM OF SPEEcH AND PRESS i EARLY AmERICAN HISTORY 246 (1963).
43. Defenders of the Sedition Act argued that "the liberty of the press consists not
in a license for every man to publish what he pleases" and was never thought to extend to
the publication of false, scandalous, and malicious writings injurious to individuals or to
the Government. From this they concluded that "a law to punish seditious and malicious

publications is not an abridgment of the liberty of the press, for it would be a manifest
absurdity to say, that a man's liberty was abridged by punishing him for doing that which
he never had a liberty to do." See Report of a House Committee, Feb. 25, 1799, 9 ANNALS
OF CONG. 2985-93. John Marshall appears to have been the only Federalist who openly
disapproved of the Alien and Sedition Laws. See 2 A. BEvERIDGE, THE LUZ OF JOHN
MARSHALL 451 (1916). Every Federalist who expressed an opinion on the subject regarded
these laws as constitutional, and Clinton Rossiter thinks they were right. See C. RossrrEr,
ALExANDER HAMILTON AND THE CONsrrruTION 100 n.163 (1964). On the other hand,
Irving Brandt credits Madison with exposing these Acts "as blatant violations of rights
guaranteed by the Constitution." I. BRANDT, JAMES MADISON, FATHER OF THE CONSTITUTION,
1787-1800, at 470 (1941).
44. 8 ANNALS OF CONG. 2140 (1798). In THE FEDERALIsT No. 84, at 560 (Mod. Lib. ed.

1937), Hamilton had asked "What is the liberty of the press?" He declared it impracticable
for anyone to give it "any definition which would not leave the utmost latitude for evasion."
id. Both the raising of this question'and the nature of the comment suggest that he did
not then understand "the liberty of the press" to signify mere exemption from prior
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answer to the contention that freedom of the press did not extend to the
publication of false, scandalous, and malicious writings against the Govern45
ment or its officers, Nicholas said:
If there could be safety in adopting the principle, that no man should
publish what is false, there certainly could be no objection to it.
But it was not the intention of the people of this country to place
any power of this kind in the hands of the General Government - for
this plain reason, the persons who would have to preside in the trials
of this sort, would themselves be parties, or at least they would be so
far interested in the issue, that the trial of the truth or falsehood of
a matter would not be safe in their hands. On this account, the
General Government has been forbidden to touch the press.
Nicholas warned of the chilling effect such a bill would have on printers.
He asked the members "to reflect on the nature of our Government" and not
46
to forget:
[T]hat all its officers are elective, and that the people have no other
means of examining their conduct but by means of the press, and an
unrestrained investigation through them of the conduct of the Government. Indeed, the heart and life of a free Government, is a free press;
take away this, and you take away its main support. . . to restrict
the press, would be to destroy the elective principle, by taking away
the information necessary to election, and there would be no difference
between it and a total denial of the right of election, but in the
degree of usurpation.
This line of argument was followed in the Virginia Resolutions and
elaborated in the report of the special committee to which the Virginia House
of Delegates referred the replies of the other state legislatures. The Virginia
Resolutions protested against the Sedition Act because it was "levelled against
the right of freely examining public characters and measures, and of free
communication among the people thereon, which has ever been justly deemed
the only effectual guardian of every other right."47 The Act was said to
exercise a power not delegated by the Constitution and to be, in fact, expressly
forbidden by the first amendment.4 The Virginia convention, which had
ratified the Federal Constitution, was said to have recommended an amendment for the very purpose of guarding the liberty of conscience and of the
press "from every possible attack of sophistry or ambition." 4 9 To those who
defended the Sedition Act by maintaining that it forbade only publications
that were false, malicious, and intended to defame, the special committee
answered as follows. First, it pointed out the difficulty in some, and the
restraint, although at that time he was talking as if the Blackstonian definition were the
correct answer to his original question.
45. Id.
46.
MENT].

2

ABRIMMENT OF THE

See also 8

47. 4 Elliot's
48.

ANNALS OF

DEBATES

DEBAras OF CONGamsS 316 (1957) [hereinafter cited as ABRmCONG. 2140-41 (1798).

529.

Id. at 528.

49. Id. at 529.
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vexation in all, cases of proving in a court of law that the allegedly seditious
statements were nevertheless the truth; and, second, it remarked that opinions,
inferences, and conjectural observations do not constitute the most persuasive
evidence before a court of law. 50 Last and most important, it observed that,
quite apart from the question of to what extent actual malice may be inferred from the mere fact of publication, it is impossible to punish the intent
to bring public officers into contempt or disrepute without striking at the
right of freely discussing public characters and measures, because those who
discuss them must expect and intend to excite unfavorable sentiments so far
as they are thought to be deserved. 51 Since the Act operates to prohibit
discussions -tending to excite such sentiments, it is, said the committee,
"equivalent to a protection of those who administer the government, if they
should at any time deserve the contempt or hatred of the people, against
being exposed to it, by free animadversions on their character and conduct." 52
The committee again urged that the right of electing officers constitutes the
essence of a free and responsible government. "The value and efficacy of
this right," it noted, "depends on the knowledge of the comparative merits
and demerits of the candidates for public trust, and on the equal freedom,
consequently, of examining and discussing these merits and demerits of the
candidates respectively."53
Although Madison and other Republicans argued that the Sedition Act
would operate to deprive the people of information on public issues and
to protect incumbent officers from adverse criticism, they did not directly give
reasons for constitutionally forbidding the abridgment of freedom of expression. They did so indirectly, however, because their statements were made to
support the contention that the Act violated the free-press guarantee of the
first amendment. And to point out that the Act would suppress information
and protect public officials was relevant to this question only if suppression
and protection were among the dangers that the speech-and-press clause was
intended to prevent. 54 Thus, the arguments of Representative Nicholas and
50. Id. at 575.
51. Id. In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), Mr. Justice Black
said, concurring, that "freedom to discuss public affairs and public officials is unquestionably
...
the kind of speech the First Amendment was primarily designed to keep within the
area of free discussion." Id. at 296-97. Against the opinion of the Court that the Constitution gives only a "conditional privilege," Mr. Justice Goldberg took the position that "the
First and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution afford to the citizen and to the press
an absolute, unconditional privilege to criticize official conduct despite the harm which
may flow from excesses and abuses .... " The theory of our Constitution, he said "is that
every citizen may speak his mind and every newspaper express its view on matters of public
concern and may not be barred from speaking or publishing because those in control of
government think 'that what is said or written is unwise, unfair, false, or malicious."
Id. at 298-99.
52. 4 Elliot's DEBATES 575.
53. Id.

54. This statement is too sweeping. To point out that the Act would have the effects
described is also relevant if the intent of the clause is unclear, for then the issue is not
whether the clause was intended to prevent evils of the kinds indicated, but whether the
clause should be construed in such a way as to prevent evils of those kinds. And to show
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the Madison committee presuppose that this clause was meant to prevent
just the sorts of evil they believed would result from the application of the
Sedition Act. Whether it was in fact intended to prevent evils of these kinds
is worth looking into, and investigation reveals that the evidence is rather
inconclusive on this point. If the clause was intended to prevent evils of
the kinds mentioned by Republican opponents of the Sedition Act, this
cannot be inferred from the language of the clause itself.55 The record of the
debates of the first Congress sheds little light on the subject. And since
records of the debates in the state legislatures are nonexistent, there is no
way of knowing exactly what the first amendment freedoms were understood
to comprise by those who ratified the first ten amendments, much less what
sorts of evils the speech-and-press clause was supposed to prevent. Once the
proposed amendments were sent to the states, they appear to have been
discussed very little either in or out of the legislatures. They are seldom
mentioned in official records, in newspapers, or in private correspondence.56
that the evil consequences of penalizing utterances or publications of the kinds specified
by section 2 of the Sedition Act are likely to be worse than those brought about by the
utterances or publications themselves is surely to give a good reason for construing the
clause as prohibiting the punishment of utterances and publications of that kind. Concerning
the actual intent of the speech-and-press provision, such evidence as there is indicates that
it was to prohibit Congress from passing any law that would restrict oral or printed expression of any kind. Therefore, Mr. Justice Black is probably right in maintaining that
"the First Amendment sought to leave Congress devoid of any kind or quality of power to
direct any type of national laws against the freedom of individuals to think what they
please, [and] advocate whatever policy they choose .... Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S.
109, 151 (1959). Professor Levy states categorically: "The framers meant Congress to be
totally without power to enact legislation respecting the press." L. LEvy, FREEDOM OF THE
PREsS FROM ZENGER TO J.FFERSON Ivi-lvii (1966). That the speech-and-press clause was
motivated by libertarian sentiments of the sort expressed by certain Republican critics of
the Sedition Act or on various occasions by Justice Black himself appears more than doubtful in the light of Professor Levy's recent research. See generally L. LEVY, LEGACY OF
SUPPRESSION ch. 5 (1960).
55. It cannot be inferred because the clause simply forbids Congress to pass any law
abridging the freedom of speech or of the press. For some interesting thoughts on interpreting this clause, see the discussion following C. CURTIS, The Role of the Constitutional
Text, in SUPREME COURT AND SUPREME LAW 72-73 (E. Cahn ed. 1954). If the phrase "the
freedom of the press" was used in such a way that the clause was to be understood as
requiring only exemption from prior restraint upon publication, as H. G. Otis and other
supporters of the Sedition Bill insisted it was, then one might reasonably doubt that the
clause was really intended to prevent the kinds of evils pointed out by opponents of the
bill. The Blackstonian definition, as Nicholas remarked, does not at all distinguish between
publications of different sorts, but leaves all to regulation by law provided only that the
Government refrains from interfering until publication is actually made. To give the clause
such a construction, he said, would bring it to a mere nullity. 2 ABRIDGMENT 381. Another
Republican, Albert Gallatin, called it "preposterous to say, that to punish a certain act was
not an abridgment of the liberty of doing that act." He declared it "an insulting evasion
of the Constitution" for proponents of the bill to say: "We claim no power to abridge
the liberty of the press; that, you shall enjoy unrestrained. You may write and publish
what you please, but if you publish anything against us, we will punish you for it. So long
as we do not prevent, but only punish your writings, it is no abridgment of your liberty of
writing and printing." 8 ANNALS OF CONG. 2159-60 (1798).
56. "Considering the importance of the first ten amendments, it is astonishing how
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Returning to the controversy over ratification of the Constitution, one
finds that the debate over the omission of a bill of rights was very general.
In Levy's words: "Freedom of the press was everywhere a grand topic for
declamation, but-the insistent demand for its protection on parchment was
not accompanied by a reasoned analysis of what it meant, how far it extended,
and under what circumstances it might be limited." 57 One reason for this
was that the anti-Federalists wanted a provision that would simply make dear
that the general government had no power whatsoever respecting speech and
publication, whiie the Federalists insisted that such a provision was unnecessary since no power over these matters was conferred by the Constitution in
the first place.58 There was no "reasoned analysis" of the nature and extent
of the freedom of the press at least partly because the actual dispute centered
on the narrow issue of whether the national government had any power at all
over the press. The Federalists maintained that it did not, and the antiFederalists demanded that all doubts be removed by an explicit prohibition. 59
Evidently the speech-and-press dause of the first amendment was inspired by
a desire to make an absolute reservation of power respecting speech and the
6
press, and not to forbid only such laws as were deemed unduly restrictive. 0

little one can find about them in the documentary sources or in the writings on the Constitution and the works of those who secured their consideration and adoption." 4 E.
CHANNING, A HISTORY or THE UNrrEn STATES 157 n.1 (1917).
57. L. LEvy, LEGACY OF SuPPRssioN 214-15 (1960).

58. I. BRAIr, TiE Bru. or RIGHTS 231 (1965). See notes 25, 26, 27 and accompanying
text supra.

59. As Professor Levy has remarked: "The Federalists who expressed themselves on the
subject concurred in stating that Congress, or the 'general government,' had no power
whatever ... to legislate on matters respecting speech or press .. " L. LEvY, LEGACY oF
SUPPRESSION 225 (1960). During the debate on the Sedition Bill, Nathaniel Macon of North
Carolina quoted statements made by leading members of several of the ratifying conventions
in order to show from the opinions of friends of the Constitution that it was understood
that prosecutions for libel could not take place under the general government, but could
only be carried on in state courts. Macon averred that not a single member of any of the
conventions ever expressed an opinion to the contrary. 2 ABRInGMEr 318, See also 8
ANNAis oF CoNG. 2151 (1798).

60. Professor Levy is convinced that the first amendment injunction against abridging
the freedom of the press was "intended and understood to prohibit any congressional regulation of the press, whether by means of a licensing law, a tax, or a sedition act." Though
the framers assumed that Congress was totally without power to enact legislation respecting
speech or the press, the first amendment was added to quiet public apprehension that
Congress might exceed the bounds of its delegated powers. And the words "Congress shall
make no law ...abridging the freedom ...." were intended to bar the possibility that
those powers might be used to curb oral or printed printed expression. "From this viewpoint," writes Levy, "the Sedition Act of 1798 was unconstitutional" Levy, Liberty and the
First Amendment 1790-1800, 68 Ams. HIST. REV. 22, 28 (1962). From this viewpoint, it is
difficult to see what sort of federal statute restricting speech or press would be constitutional.
During the course of the House debate on July 10, 1798, Albert Gallatin asserted that only
the "elastie' clause gave color to the constitutional authority claimed for the Sedition Bill;
and then he pointed out that it was to remove fears regarding the possible misuse of that
clause that the first amendment was proposed and adopted. 8 ANNALS OF CONG. 2158-59
(1798). That this claim is correct is borne out by the speech made by Madison on June 8,
1789, the day he introduced his amendments. See I ANNALS OF CONG. 435 (1789).
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It is therefore not surprising that no distinctions were made between permissible kinds and impermissible kinds of speech and publication, 61 and that
no discussion implied or suggested that the phrase "the freedom of the press"
was used in some definite and restricted sense that was understood to leave
Congress free to punish the kinds of writings that defenders of the Sedition
Act were later to call "the licentiousness of the press" and "the abuse of that
liberty."62 On the contrary: 63
[T]he Framers themselves, whatever they understood freedom of
speech or press to mean, had given the public specific assurances again
and again that neither speech nor press could be the subject of repressive legislation by a government bereft of authority as to that subject.
...It was only after the new government had gone into operation and
the First Amendment was ratified that many of the Framers and their
associates spoke and acted as if freedom of speech and press could be
prosecuted in federal courts and be abridged by Congress as well.
They now argued that the Sedition Act was a law necessary and proper for
carrying into execution certain expressly delegated powers, and that it was
not contrary to the first amendment inasmuch as the freedom of the press
secured against congressional abridgment did not extend to seditious and
malicious publications.64 No wonder the Madison committee found it "painful to remark how much the arguments now employed in behalf of the
Sedition Act, are at variance with the reasoning which then justified the
Constitution, and its ratification"65 To adopt the Federalist position regarding the constitutionality of the Act, the committee commented caustically:66
61. An exception to this generalization is a statement respecting the meaning of the
phrase "the liberty of the press" made by James Wilson before the Pennsylvania ratifying
convention. 2 Elliot's DEBATES 449.
62. In the House debate over the Sedition Bill, Gallatin stated that he and other
opponents of the bill understood the first amendment to mean that "Congress could not
pass any law to punish any real or supposed abuse of the press," while "the construction
given to it by the supporters of the bill was, that it did not prevent them to punish what
they called the licentiousness of the press, but merely forbade their laying any previous
restraints upon it." 8 ANNALS OF CONG. 2160 (1798). The evidence respecting the framers'
views of the powers of Congress even prior to the adoption of the first amendment and the
evidence respecting the aims of those who sought and supported a speech-and-press
guarantee sustains Gallatin's interpretation, which is best summed up in his own words:
"Congress were by that amendment prohibited from passing any law abridging [the freedom
of speech and of the press]; they were, therefore, prohibited from adding any restraint,
either by previous restrictions, or by subsequent punishment . . . in short, they were
under the obligation of leaving that subject where they found it -of passing no law,
either directly or indirectly, affecting that liberty." Id. at 2159-60.
63. L. LEvy, LEGACY OF SUPPRESSION 237-38 (1960). Cf. I. BRANDT, THE BILL OF RIGHTS
224-31 (1965).
64. The press clause was, in fact, said, to prohibit only previous restraints upon publication. See the speeches of Representatives H. G. Otis and R. G. Harper in 8 ANNALS OF
CONG. 2147-48, 2167-68 (1798).
65. 4 Elliot's DEBATE 572.
66. Id. Professor Mendelson has defended the Supreme Court's recent use of the socalled "balancing" test by pointing out that "the language of the first amendment is highly
ambiguous, and that this ambiguity is at best compounded by history." Mendelson, On the
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[W]ould exhibit a number of respectable states, as denying, first, that
any power over the press was delegated by the Constitution; as proposing, next, that any amendment to it should explicitly declare that
no such power was delegated; and, finally, as concurring in an amendment actually recognizing or delegating such a power.
The question concerning the aim of the speech-and-press clause might
well be answered by arguing that, since it was apparently intended to make
dear that Congress was forbidden to pass any laws that would in any
manner restrict oral or written expression, it must have been intended to
forbid the enactment of any law that would either restrain publishers from,
or punish them for, reporting on the qualifications or the conduct of public
officers or commenting adversely on them. Indeed this reply is not supported by this inference alone, for those who found fault with the omission
of a bill of rights from the original Constitution had clearly expressed the
fear that Congress might abuse or exceed its power and then seek by repressive
laws to prevent disclosure or to silence criticism. 67

Morevoer, those state

ratifying conventions that included the freedom of the press among the rights
whose protection they recommended offered the same reason that had been
given for the free-press provisions of certain of the state declarations of rights:
the freedom of the press is one of the greatest bulwarks of liberty. Of course,
the beliefs and aims of those who demanded and recommended an amendment
to protect the freedom of the press are not necessarily indicative of the intent
of those who later proposed or ratified the first amendment. However, what
we know about both groups supports a supposition that the latter group
shared the same beliefs as the former. Thus, it seems safe to conclude that
the intended purpose of the speech-and-press clause was just what Republican
critics of the Sedition Act said it was: to safeguard the free discussion of
public characters and measures to the end that capable and honorable men
should be elected to public office and governmental power be scrupulously
and responsibly exercised. 68
Meaning of the First Amendment: Absolutes in the Balance, 50 CAiiF. L. REv. 821 (1962).
He quotes with approval Zechariah Chafee's statement that "the framers had no very clear
idea as to what they meant by 'the freedom of speech or of the press."' Id. at 823. Granting
Chafee's point and Mendelson's truism regarding the equivocal character of the word
"freedom," I would nevertheless insist that the framers seem to have had a much clearer
idea concerning the import of the speech-and-press clause taken as a whole: that it deprived Congress of any power it might otherwise be supposed to have respecting oral or
printed expression. If this is so, then it cannot very well be maintained either that the
"freedom of speech and of the press," as that phrase is used in the speech-and-press clause,
signifies only the liberty from prior restraint, as Federalists found it convenient to argue in
1798, or that its meaning is rendered uncertain by reason of its extreme ambiguity, as
Mendelson argues in 1962. Far from compounding its ambiguity, history, if it does anything,
lessens it. See notes 54, 58, 59, 61, and accompanying text supra.
67. For pertinent statements by delegates to the state ratifying conventions, see 2 Elliot's
DEBAa's 177; 3 Elliot's DEBAaEs 441, 445; 4 Elliot's DEBAmS 167, 312, 314, 337.
68. If the purpose of the clause was as stated, it cannot be maintained with much
credibility that the phrases "the freedom of speech" and "the freedom of the press" are so
ambiguous or indefinite in meaning as to defy reasonable judicial interpretation. Judge
Cooley long ago pointed out that one extrinsic aid to be used in determining the meaning
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Unfortunately, this conclusion can be safely drawn only if it is duly
qualified. Most probably the clause was intended and expected to stop
Congress from interfering with political discussion, but it does not follow
that those who sought to restrain Congress also wished to halt all governmental restrictions upon political discussion. For one thing, it is not at all
clear that the framers did not suppose that federal courts would have common
law jurisdiction and thereby be able to try persons charged with committing
common law crimes such as seditious libel.69 Second, it should not be forgotten that the first amendment imposes limitations only upon Congress,
and that the Senate had failed to pass a House-approved amendment that
would have prohibited the states from infringing upon the freedoms of speech
and of the press. Third, it now appears, as Professor Levy says, that: 7°
[T]he prohibition on Congress was motivated far less by a desire to
give immunity to political expression than by a solicitude for states'
rights and the federal principle. The primary purpose of the First
Amendment was to reserve to the states an exclusive legislative authority in the field of speech and press.
This latter purpose would not of course be incompatible with a desire to
safeguard political expression if it were true that the states accorded, and
were known to accord, considerable protection to speech and press. But the
fact is that the states did not, and there is no reason to think that those who
recommended, or those who proposed, or those who ratified the First Amendment were unaware of this. Twelve states afforded no constitutional protection at all to the freedom of speech, and the eight states that constitutionally
of an otherwise doubtful constitutional provision is "a contemplation of the object to be
accomplished or the mischief to be remedied or guarded against by the phrase in which the
ambiguity is met with." T. CooLEY, A TRATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMrrATIONS 80 (6th
ed. 1890). Various opinions of the Supreme Court have undertaken to state the rationale
of the speech-and-press clause, and those coming closest to expressing what appears to have
been the position of the framers were written by Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes. See
Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 369 (1931); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 716-22
(1931).
69. The common law jurisdiction of federal courts was asserted by John Jay, first
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and his view was held by most members of the
bench and bar. F. WHARTON, STATE TRIALS OF THE UNrrED STATES DURING THE ADMINISTRATIONS OF WASHINGTON AND ADAMS
1 (1849). Prosecutions for seditious libel against the
federal government or its officers began before the passage of the Alien and Sedition Laws.
C. HAINES, TRE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN GOVERNMENT AND POLrrTCS, 17891835, at 159 (1944). For an account of the controversy over whether the United States has
a common law giving federal courts authority to punish crimes other than those defined by
federal statute, see I C. WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY ch. 9 (rev:
ed. 1926). This question was answered affirmatively by United States v. Ravara, 2 U.S. (2
Dall.) 297 (1793), but the Court later reversed itself in United States v. Hudson, 11 U.S.
(7 Cranch) 32 (1812).
70. Levy, Liberty and the First Amendment: 1790-1800, 68 AM. Hisr. REv. 22, 30 (1962).
Essentially the same view was expressed several decades ago by Edward S. Corwin. Corwin,
Freedom of Speech and Press Under the First Amendment: A Resumd, 30 YALE L.J. 1062
(1920). See also J. RocHE, COURTS AND RIGHTS 58-59 (1961); Howe, Book Review, 13 WM. &
MARY Q. 573, 575-76 (3d ser. 1956).
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safeguarded the freedom of the press did not thereby abrogate longstanding
common law restrictions on "abuses" such as seditious libel.71 Few men of
the day stopped to consider whether state practices were inconsistent with
securing that full and free examination of public men and measures that was
generally acknowledged to be essential to the effective popular control of
government. Those who did ponder the matter believed that the freedom of
the press was sufficiently protected if prior restraints were prohibited and if
those prosecuted in state courts for criminal libel were allowed to give
evidence of the truth of their accusations and the jury were empowered to
decide whether the utterances were criminal.T2 This view is obviously open
to the very objections that Nicholas and the Madison committee leveled
against the Sedition Act itself. However, it must be remembered that Republican critics of the Act would gladly have reserved the cognizance of seditious
libels to state courts and that Jefferson himself held that state legislatures had
full power to curb the excesses of the press.7 3 Men of the generation of the
framers generally believed that certain forms of expression merited punishment, and they seem to have taken for granted that state courts and legislatures could be trusted to recognize and deal with them without unduly
jeopardizing that "elective principle," which the first amendment was thought
necessary to safeguard from encroachment by the federal government. If they
were mistaken about this, the mistake is understandable in view of their
preoccupation with the dangers of federal power and their failure to consider
the possibilities of encroachments by the states. It has taken subsequent
history to teach the painful lesson that freedom of expression is threatened
more by state governments than by the federal government.

71. It was these common law restrictions and certain state constitutional qualifications
that Justice Frankfurter was referring to when he declared that "the historic antecedents
of the First Amendment preclude the notion that its purpose was to give unqualified
immunity to every expression that touched on matters within the range of political interest."
Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 521-25 (1951). This kind of evidence may tend to
support Frankfurter's general pronouncement that "Free speech is subject to prohibition
of those abuses of expression which a civilized society may forbid," but it is insufficient to
establish his contention regarding the purpose of the first amendment. As has been shown,
independent evidence indicates that the speech-and-press clause was intended to give expression unqualified immunity from congressional restriction. That it was not supposed to
give expression immunity from limitation by the states is obvious from its very language.
72. In 1789, William Cushing and John Adams corresponded over the construction to
be given to the free-press article in the Massachusetts Constitution. For a discussion of the
views they exchanged, see L. Lavy, LEGACY OF SUPPREssIoN 192-96 (1960). Another example

is provided by Justice James Iredell's charge to the grand jury in the trial of the Northhampton insurgents. F. WHARTON, supra note 69, at 478-79.
73. 8 ANNALs OF CONG., 2142, 2152, 2163 (1798). Jefferson expressed this opinion in
various places, e.g., in a letter to Abigail Adams dated September 11, 1804. TnE ADAMsJEFFER ON LErrms 279 (L. Cappon ed. 1959).
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